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A game theoretic approach to a peer-to-peer cloud storage model
Fabio Fagnani1, Barbara Franci2, and Ennio Grasso3
Abstract— Classical cloud storage based on external data
providers has been recognized to suffer from a number of
drawbacks. This is due to its inherent centralized architec-
ture which makes it vulnerable to external attacks, malware,
technical failures, as well to the large premium charged for
business purposes. In this paper, we propose an alternative
distributed peer-to-peer cloud storage model which is based on
the observation that the users themselves often have available
storage capabilities to be offered in principle to other users.
Our set-up is that of a network of users connected through a
graph, each of them being at the same time a source of data to
be stored externally and a possible storage resource. We cast
the peer-to-peer storage model to a Potential Game and we
propose an original decentralized algorithm which makes units
interact, cooperate, and store a complete back up of their data
on their connected neighbors. We present theoretical results
on the algorithm as well a good number of simulations which
validate our approach.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud storage on the Internet has come to rely almost
exclusively on data providers serving as trusted third parties
to transfer and store the data. While the system works
well enough in most cases, it still suffers from the inherent
weaknesses of the trust-based model. The traditional cloud
is open to a variety of security threats, including man-in-
the-middle attacks, and malware that expose sensitive and
private consumer and corporate data. Furthermore, current
cloud storage applications are charging large premiums on
data storage facilities to business clients. Moreover, these
cloud storage providers may have technical failures that can
cause data breaches and unavailability, much to the distress
of the users and applications that depend on them.
To address the aforementioned shortcomings, a decentral-
ized peer-to-peer cloud storage model would be the right an-
swer. On the wake of the successful peer-to-peer file sharing
model of applications like BitTorrent and its lookalike, the
same philosophy may well be leveraged on a different but
very similar application service like storage. Indeed a slew
of fledgling and somehow successful startups are entering
in this market niche. Among the most noteworthy examples
are:
• Storj: www.youtube.com/channel/UC-cTEqWwZV5Rl-
h0RZsp2Qw,
• BitTorrent Sync: www.getsync.com/,
• Ethos: www.youtube.com/watch?v=qUftGCQ5dqo,
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• SpaceMonkeys: www.spacemonkey.com/.
Clearly, a completely decentralized peer-to-peer model must
account for some challenging technical difficulties that are
absent in a centralized cloud model. Firstly, security and
privacy must be carefully implemented by ensuring end-to-
end encryption resistant to attackers. In addition, the model
must account for the latency, performance, and downtime of
average user devices.
Albeit the above technical issues are challenging, they
can be addressed with the right tools and architectures
available at current state of the art technology and will
not be considered in this paper. What remains an open
question up to now is how to endow the system with the
right incentives for the end users to collaborate and share
their storage commodity with each other. We believe that the
answer to that question comes from the formal framework
of game-theory which provides the mathematical tools to
ensure successful cooperation among users / players. There
are (at least) two ways in which game-theory, with its plenty
folk-theorems, can be applied to the real world. One is as
a tool to study an ongoing phenomenon. This is the typical
setting of social and psychological sciences. A second more
engineering approach is to leverage game-theory to design
specific mechanisms, i.e. set rules of the game that will
bring the interaction to the most desired outcome, which is
basically the maximum global welfare, or Pareto dominated
equilibrium of the game. This work follows this second
approach.
In this paper, we consider a network of units (PC’s
but possibly also smartphones or other devices possessing
storage capabilities) which need to store externally a back up
of their data and, at the same time, can offer space available
to store data of other connected units. In this set up, we
cast the peer-to-peer storage model to an allocation Potential
Game and we propose an original decentralized algorithm
which make units interact, cooperate, and store a complete
back up of their data on their connected neighbors.
Units are assumed to be connected through a network
and, autonomously, at random time, to activate and allocate
or move their data pieces among the neighboring units.
Formally, each unit has a utility function which gives a value
to their neighbors on the basis of their reliability, their current
congestion (resources have bounded storage capabilities),
and the amount of data the unit has already stored in them.
Following classical evolutionary game theory [6], we propose
an algorithm based on a noisy best response action: each time
a unit activates, it decides the neighbor to use on the basis
of a Gibbs probability distribution having its peak on the
maxima of the utility function.
In the remaining part of this section, we formally define
the storage allocation problem and we show its equivalence
with classical matching problem on a graph. This allows us
to use celebrated Hall’s theorem and give a necessary and
sufficient condition for the allocation problem to be solvable.
Section II is devoted to cast the problem to a potential
game theoretic framework [2] and to propose a distributed
algorithm which is an instance of a noisy best response
dynamics [6]. We claim a fundamental result, which will be
proven in a forthcoming paper, which says that in the double
limit when time goes to infinity and the noise parameter goes
to 0, the algorithm converges to a Nash equilibrium which
is, in particular, a global maximum of the potential function.
This guarantees that the solution will indeed be close to
the global welfare of the community. Finally, Section III is
devoted to the presentation of an extensive set of simulations.
A conclusions section ends the paper.
A. Related Work
Though allocation games have been considered before in
the literature, they all substantially differ from the model we
propose and study in this paper. In [4] the authors consider an
allocation problem casted to a pure congestion game. Utility
functions of units measure the congestion of a resource
simply as a function of the number of units currently using
it, but they do not impose any strict storage limitation. The
algorithm they propose is a classical best response algorithm
and is shown to achieve Nash equilibrium. Our model differs
considerably as we also consider reliability of the resources
and data fragmentation in the utility functions and, moreover,
we impose strict storage limitations. A crucial consequence
of this is that classical best response algorithms would not
work in our case: Example 3 shows a situation where such
an algorithm would halt before allocation is completed.
Allocation games are also considered in [1] where, however,
the proposed algorithm units are not interacting through a
graph but rather through a device that acts like a leader
selecting which resources can be used. A related context
where congestion games have been used is that of networking
routing [3].
At a broader level, the noisy best response algorithm
we propose in this paper fits in the so-called evolutionary
game theory [6] which has already been extensively used in
studying other networking problems [5].
B. The model
Consider a set X of units which play the double role
of users who have to allocate externally a back up of their
data, as well resources where data from other units can be
allocated. Generically, an element of X will be called a unit,
while the terms user and resource will be used when the
unit is considered in the two possible roles of, respectively,
a source or a recipient of data. We assume units to be
connected through a directed graph G = (X ,E ) where a
link (x,y) ∈ E means that unit x is allowed to storage data
in unit y. We denote by
Nx := {y ∈X |(x,y) ∈ E }, N−y := {x ∈X |(x,y) ∈ E }
respectively, the out- and the in-neighborhood of a node.
Note the important different interpretation in our context: Nx
represents the set of resources available to unit x while N−y
is the set of units having access to resource y. If D ⊆ X ,
we put N(D) = ∪x∈DNx and N−(D) = ∪x∈DN−x .
We imagine the data possessed by the units to be quantized
atoms of the same size. Each unit x is characterized by two
non negative integers:
• αx is the number of data atoms that unit x needs to back
up into his neighbors,
• βx is the number of data atoms that unit x can accept
and store from his neighbors.
The numbers {αx} and {βx} will be assembled into two
vectors denoted, respectively, α and β . We also define
Ax = {(x,a) |a ∈ {1, . . . ,αx}}, A =
⋃
x∈X
Ax
Given the triple (G ,α,β ), we define an allocation as any
map Q : A →X satisfying the properties expressed below.
(C1) Graph constraint Q(x,a) ∈ Nx for all x ∈X and a ∈
{1, . . . ,αx};
(C2) Storage limitation For every y ∈X ,
|Q−1(y)| ≤ βy
The fact that Q(x,a) = y means that user x has allocated the
data atom a into resource y.
We will say that the allocation problem is solvable if an
allocation Q exists. We denote by Q the set of allocations.
We will also need to consider partial allocations, namely
maps Q : D → X where D ⊆A satisfying, where defined,
conditions (C1) and (C2). We denote by Qp the set of partial
allocations.
In the following section we study the conditions under
which the allocation problem is solvable, namely conditions
under which Q is non empty.
C. The allocation problem as a matching problem
Define
By = {(y,b) |b ∈ {1, . . . ,βy}}, B =
⋃
y∈X
By
Consider now the bipartite graph P = (A ×B,EP) where
((x,a),(y,b)) ∈ EP iff (x,y) ∈ E . An allocation naturally
induces a matching on P which is complete on A . To this
aim, notice that, from Q ∈Q and using condition (C2), we
can construct an injective mapping ˜Q : A → B such that
˜Q(x,a) = (Q(x,a),b) for every x∈X and for all a. We then
define
M :=
⋃
x∈X
{((x,a),(y,b)) ∈A ×B |(y,b) = ˜Q(x,a)}
It is clear that this procedure can be inverted and that from
any matching of M complete on A we can associate an
allocation for (G ,α,β ). This equivalence allows to use clas-
sical results like the Hall’s marriage theorem to characterize
the existence of allocations. Precisely we have the following
result
Theorem 1: Given (G ,α,β ), there exists an allocation iff
the following condition is satisfied:
∑
x∈D
αx ≤ ∑
y∈N(D)
βy ∀D⊆X (1)
Proof: By Hall’s theorem, the existence of a matching
in P complete on A is equivalent to the condition
|A| ≤ |NP (A)| ∀A ⊆A (2)
where NP(A)⊆B is the out-neighborhood of A in P . Given
A ⊆ A let ¯A be the union of those Ax’s for which Ax ∩
A 6= /0. By the way the bipartite graph P has been defined,
it follows that NP(A) = NP ( ¯A), so that it is sufficient to
restrict condition (2) to subsets A such that Ax∩A 6= /0 yield
Ax ⊆ A. Given such an A, if we consider D = {x |Ax ⊆ A},
we immediately obtain that (1) coincides with (2).
In general, it is not necessary to check the validity of (1)
for every subset D. We say that D ⊆ X is maximal if for
any D′)D, it holds N(D′))N(D). We say that D1,D2 ⊆X
are independent if N(D1)∩N(D2) = /0 and D⊆X is called
irreducible if it can not be decomposed into the union of
two non empty independent subsets. Clearly, it is sufficient
to verify (1) for the subclass of maximal irreducible subsets.
Example 1: If G is complete, we have that N({x}) =X \
{x} while N(D) = X for all D such that |D| ≥ 2. Hence,
the only maximal irreducible subsets are the singletons {x}
and the set X . Condition (1) in this case reduces to
αx ≤ ∑
y6=x
βy, ∀x ∈X ∑
x∈X
αx ≤ ∑
y∈X
βy (3)
In general, the class of maximal irreducible subsets can be
large and grow more than linearly in the size of X , as the
following example shows.
Example 2: If G = (X ,E ) is a line graph (X =
{1,2, . . . ,n} and E = {(i, i+ 1), i = 1, . . . ,n− 1}) it can be
checked that the maximal irreducible subsets are those of the
form {i, i+ 2, . . . , i+ 2s}.
In case when αx = a and βy = b are both constant,
something more can be said.
Proposition 2: Given (G ,α,β ), where G is regular, αx =
a and βy = b for all x,y ∈X , there exists an allocation iff
a ≤ b.
Proof: By Theorem 1, we simply have to show that
|D| ≤ |N(D)| for every subset D ⊆X . Let ED be the set of
edges having one of the nodes in D. If d is the degree of the
nodes in G , we have that
d|D|= |ED| ≥ d|N(D)|
From the practical point of view, the equivalence of our
problem with a classical matching problem, is, however, of
little utility, as the number of nodes of P is of the size
∑αx +∑βy which will in general be very large.
Moreover, in case allocations exist, we want to be able
to construct one in a distributed way without the need of
any supervision. The algorithm must be iterative in order
to cope with possible time modifications of the units, of
their interconnection and of their data storage needs and
limitations. Also the possibility that units leave and enter
the community must be considered.
Also we want to have the possibility to find solution
possessing certain extra features:
• (Reliability) resources will often have different relia-
bility properties and we want to give preference, in the
allocation, to more reliable resources;
• (Congestion) equally reliable resources should be
equally used, avoiding congestion phenomena;
• (Aggregation) users prefer to use as few resources as
possible to allocate their back up data.
The reason for this last feature comes from the fact that an
exceeding fragmentation of the back up data will cause a
blow up in the number of communications among the units
both in the storage and recover phases. This feature should
be considered against another feature which in this paper is
not going to be addressed, which is that of diversification
of back ups: in real applications units will need to back up
multiple copies of their data in order to cope with security
and possible failure phenomena. In that case, these multiple
copies will need to be stored in different units. This issue
will be analyzed in a subsequent paper.
The above desired features may be contradictory in gen-
eral and we want to have tunable parameters to make the
algorithm converge towards a desired compromised solution.
The proposed algorithm will be fully distributed: units will
iteratively allocate and move their data among the neighbors
on the basis of the space available and trying to maximize a
utility function. There will be an underlying game theoretic
structure inspired by the desired features described above.
Our algorithm will be analyzed with the techniques of
evolutionary game theory and it will be shown to yield a
reversible Markov process converging to a Nash equilibrium
of the game.
II. THE GAME THEORETIC SET-UP AND THE ALGORITHM
Given a partial allocation Q ∈ Qp, consider the matrix
W (Q)∈NX ×X where W (Q)xy is the number of atomic data
that x has copied inside y under the allocation Q, namely,
W (Q)xy := |Q−1(y)∩Ax| (4)
Clearly W =W (Q) satisfies the following conditions
(P1) Wxy ≥ 0 for all x,y and Wxy = 0 whenever (x,y) 6∈ E .
(P2) W x := ∑
y∈X
Wxy ≤ αx for all x ∈X .
(P3) Wy := ∑
x∈X
Wxy ≤ βy for all y ∈X .
It is immediate to see that, conversely, if there exists W satis-
fying these properties (such a W is called a partial allocation
state), then, from it, we can construct a partial allocation Q
such that W = W (Q). Clearly, under this correspondence,
we have that Q ∈Q iff W satisfies (P2) with equality for all
x ∈X . In this case W is called an allocation state. The set
of partial allocation states and the set of allocation states are
denoted, respectively, with the symbols Wp and W .
It is clear that two partial allocations Q1 and Q2 such that
W (Q1) = W (Q2), only differ for a permutation of the data
atoms of the various units and for many purpouses can be
considered as equivalent. All the quantity of interest for the
game theoretic setting will be defined at the level of W .
We are now ready to define the game theoretic model. We
first define utilities: under a (possibly partial) allocation state
W , the utility of a unit x in using resource y is given by
fxy(W ) := λy− kcWy/βy + kaWxy (5)
The first term λy encodes possible reliability differences
among resources, the second term is instead a congestion
term which takes into consideration the level of use of the
resource, and, finally, the third term depends on both x and
y and pushes a unit to allocate in those resources where it
has already allocated. kc,ka are two non-negative parameters
to tune the effect of the congestion and of the aggregation
terms, respectively.
The choice of this particular utility function has been made
on the basis of simplicity considerations (notice that the state
W enters linearly in it) and on the fact that, as exploited
below, this leads to a potential game. In principle, different
terms in the utility function can be introduced in order to
make units to take into considerations other desired features
(e.g multiple back up).
Define
Ψ(W ) := ∑
y∈X
Wy
∑
s=0
[λy− kcs/βy]+ ka ∑
x,y∈X
Wxy
∑
s=0
s (6)
and notice that if W,W ′ ∈W are such that W ′ =W − exy¯ +
exy¯′ , then,
Ψ(W ′)−Ψ(W )
= (λy¯′− kcW ′y¯′/βy¯′ + kaW ′x¯y¯′)− (λy¯− kcWy¯/βy¯ + kaWx¯y¯)
= fxy¯′(W ′)− fxy¯(W ) (7)
In other terms, under the state allocation W , when user x
moves a data atom from y¯ to y¯′, it experiences a variation
in utility given by Ψ(W ′)−Ψ(W ). Ψ is called a potential of
the game. Given W ∈Wp and x ∈X , put
X
x(W ) := {y ∈ Nx |Wy < βy}
the set of resources still available for x under the current
allocation state W .
An allocation state W ∈W (and also any Q∈Q such that
W (Q) =W ) is called a Nash equilibrium if, for every x∈X ,
for every y ∈ Nx such that Wxy > 0, for every y′ ∈X x(W ),
it holds
fxy(W )≥ fxy′ (W ′)
Maxima of Ψ are clearly Nash equilibria while, in general,
the converse is not true. Considering that Ψ is defined on a
finite set, a maximum, and thus a Nash equilibrium, always
exists. Under a Nash equilibrium, a unit whose goal is
to maximize its utility, has no advantage in moving their
allocated data, under the standing assumption that only one
data atom at a time can be moved. Notice that data atoms
are to be interpreted as aggregations of data and the decision
of their size is part of the design of the algorithm. Clearly
different levels of granularity will give rise to different game
models including different Nash equilibria.
For any W ∈ Wp, we define the Gibbs probability distri-
bution over X x(W )as
py(W,x) =
eγ fxy(W+exy)
Zγ
where γ > 0 and where
Zγ = ∑
y∈X x(W)
eγ fxy(W+exy)
is a normalizing factor.
A. The algorithm
The algorithm we are proposing below is a distributed
and asynchronous algorithm where units activate at random
independent times and either allocate or move their atoms,
undertaking a relaxed stochastic version of the utility maxi-
mization.
The algorithm is mathematically described as a continuous
time Markov process Qt : Dt → X on the set of partial
allocations Qp. Precisely, units are assumed to be equipped
with independent internal Poisson clocks with possibly dif-
ferent clicking rates. We denote by νx the clicking rate of
unit x. When a unit activates it can either allocate a further
data atom (if allocation is not completed yet) or move a
data atom from one resource to another. The choice of the
resource where either allocate or move the data atom is done
according to the Gibbs probability: this is a classical choice
in evolutionary game theory and will be amenable to a fairly
complete theoretical analysis. The details of the algorithm
are described below. We put W (t) =W (Qt).
1) Assume x¯ activates at time t. With probabilities
Pall(W (t), x¯), Pdis(W (t), x¯)
the resource x¯ will make, respectively, an allocation or
a distribution move as explained below. Of course we
are assuming that
Pall(W (t), x¯)+Pdis(W (t), x¯) = 1,
Pall(W (t), x¯) = 0 if W (t)x¯ = αx¯
Pdis(W (t), x¯) = 0 if W (t)x¯ = 0
2) (ALLOCATION MOVE)
• Choose (x¯, a¯) uniformly at random in (A \Dt)∩
Ax¯
• Choose y∗ according to the Gibbs probability
py∗(W (t), x¯)
• Put Dt+ = Dt ∪{(x¯, a¯)}, and Qt+ : Dt+ →X by
Qt+(x,a) =
{
y∗ if(x,a) = (x¯, a¯)
Qt(x,a) if(x,a) ∈ Dt
3) (DISTRIBUTION MOVE)
• Choose y¯ according to the probability qy¯ =
W (t)x¯y¯/W (t)x¯.
• Choose (x¯, a¯) uniformly at random in Dt ∩Ax¯
• Choose y∗ according to the Gibbs probability
py∗(W (t)− ex¯y¯, x¯)
• Put Dt+ = Dt ,
Qt+(x,a)=
{
y∗ if(x,a) = (x¯, a¯)
Qt(x,a) if(x,a) ∈ Dt \ {(x¯, a¯)}
The fact of using a noisy algorithm is crucial in our
setting. In the following example we show a situation where
a classical best response algorithm would remain stacked
without completing the allocation.
Example 3: We are considering a line graph of four users
as depicted below.
1 2 3 4
Each user x has αx = βx = 1. Reliabilities are instead λ2 = 3
while λx = 1 for x = 1,3,4. Assume we are in the partial
allocation state W ∈Wp given by
W :=


0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0


Clearly, this partial allocation state could be reached by
the group zero allocation state with positive probability (the
key point is that unit 3 activates before unit 1 and chooses
the most reliable resource). It is also clear that under a
best response strategy (γ = +∞) this state allocation is an
equilibrium: unit 1 can not allocate, unless unit 3 moves its
data to 4 but this will never happen because f34(W − e32)<
f32(W − e32).
B. Theoretical results
In this section we analyze the behavior of the algorithm
introduced above. We will essentially show two results. First,
we prove that if the set of allocation Q is not empty (i.e.
condition (1) is satisfied), the algorithm above will find one
in bounded time with probability 1. Second, we will show
that, under a slightly stronger assumption than (1), in the
double limit t →+∞ and then γ →+∞, the Markov process
induced by the algorithm will always converge, in law, to a
Nash equilibrium which is a global maximum of the potential
function Ψ.
In order to prove such results, it will be necessary to go
through a number of intermediate technical steps. First of
all, it will be convenient to work directly with the process
W (t) =W (Q(t)) which is also Markovian because of the way
the transitions have been defined, considering that the results
we are claiming, can all be expressed and established at this
simpler level.
Given W,W ′ ∈ Wp, we denote by PW,W ′ the transition
probability from W to W ′ of the Markov chain underlying
the process W (t). Lp denotes the graph on Wp where an
edge (W,W ′) is present if and only if PW,W ′ > 0.
Our strategy will be to show that from any element
W ∈ Wp there is a path in Lp to some element W ′ ∈ W .
This, by standard Markov chain arguments, leads to the
result that allocation will be achieved in bounded time with
probability 1. After, we will show that Lp restricted to the
set of allocations W is irreducible and this will then yield
the asymptotic result.
First we consider the problem of finding a path to an
allocation state. Given W ∈ Wp we define the following
subsets of units
X
f (W ) := {x ∈X |W x = αx}
X
sat(W ) := {x ∈X \X f (W ) | 6 ∃y ∈ Nx s.t W (Q)y < βy}
Units in X f (W ) are called fully allocated: these units have
completed the allocation of their data under the state W .
Units in X sat(W ) are called saturated: they have not yet
completed their allocation, however, under the current state
W , they can not make any action, neither allocate, nor
distribute. Finally, define
W
sat
p := {W ∈Wp \W |X = X f (W )∪X sat(W )}
It is clear that from any W ∈Wp\W satp , some allocation move
can be performed. Instead, if we are in a state W ∈W satp , only
possibly fully allocated units can make a distribution move.
Notice that, because of condition (1), for sure there exist
resources y such that Wy < βy and these resources are indeed
exclusively connected to fully allocated units. The key point
is to show that in a finite number of distribution moves it is
always possible to move some data atoms from resources
connected to saturated units to resources with available
space: this will then make possible a further allocation move.
For any fixed W ∈Wp, we can consider the following graph
structure on X thought as set of resources: HW = (X ,EW ).
Given y1,y2 ∈X , there is an edge from y1 to y2 if and only
if there exists x ∈X for which
Wxy1 > 0, (x,y2) ∈ E
The edge from y1 to y2 will be indicated with the symbol
y1 →x y2 (to also recall the unit x involved). The presence of
the edge means that the two resources y1 and y2 are in the
neighborhood of a common unit x which is using y1 under
W . This indicates that x can in principle move some of its
data currently stored in y1 into resource y2 if this last one is
available. We have the following technical result
Lemma 3: Suppose (G ,α,β ) satisfies (1). Fix W ∈ Wp
and let y¯∈X be such that there exists x¯∈ Ny¯ with W x¯ <αx¯.
Then, there exists a sequence
y¯ = y0, x0, y1, . . . ,yt−1, xt−1, yt (8)
satisfying the following conditions
(Sa) Both families of the yk’s and of the xk’s are each made
of distinct elements;
(Sb) yk →xk yk+1 for every k = 0, . . . , t− 1;
(Sc) Wyk = βyk for every k = 0, . . . , t−1, and W (Q)yt < βyt .
Proof: Let Y ⊆X be the subset of nodes which can
be reached from y¯ in HW . Preliminarily, we prove that there
exists y′ ∈ Y such that Wy′ < βy′ . Let
Z := {x ∈X | ∃y ∈ Y ,Wxy > 0}
and notice that, by the way Y and Z have been defined,
x ∈Z , (x,y) ∈ E ⇒ y ∈ Y (9)
Suppose now that, contrarily to the thesis, Wy ≥ βy for all
y ∈ Y . Then,
∑
x∈Z
αx ≤ ∑
y∈Y
βy
= ∑
y∈Y
Wy
= ∑
y∈Y
∑
x∈Z
Wxy
= ∑
x∈Z
W x
< ∑
x∈Z
αx
(10)
where the first inequality follows from (9) and (1), the
first equality from the contradiction hypothesis, the second
equality from the definition of Z , the third equality again
from (9) and, finally, last inequality from the existence of x¯.
This is clearly absurd and thus proves our claim.
Consider now a path of minimal length from y¯ to Y in
HW :
y¯ = y0 →x0 y1 → ··· → yt−1 →xt−1 yt
and notice that the sequence y¯ = y0, x0, y1, . . . ,yt−1, xt−1, yt
will automatically satisfy properties (Sa) to (Sc).
We are now ready to prove the first main result.
Theorem 4: Assume that
1) νx > 0 for every x ∈X such that αx > 0,
2) Pall(W, x¯)> 0 if W x¯ < αx¯,
3) (G ,α,β ) satisfies (1).
Then, with probability 1, the Markov process W (t) will be,
after a finite number of jumps, in the set of allocations W .
Proof: In order to prove the claim, it will be sufficient
to show that from any W ∈ Wp there is a path in Lp (the
graph underlying the possible transitions of the process W (t))
to some element W ′ ∈ W . We will prove it by a double
induction process. To this aim we consider two indices
associated to any W ∈Wp \W . The first one is defined by
mW = ∑
x∈X
(αx−W x)≥ 1
To define the second, consider any x¯ ∈ X \X f (W ). We
can apply Lemma 3 to W and any y¯ ∈ Nx¯ and obtain that we
can find a sequence of agents y¯ = y0, x0, y1, . . . , yt−1, xt−1, yt
satisfying the properties (Sa), (Sb), and (Sc) above. Among
all the possible choices of x¯ ∈ X , y¯ ∈ Nx¯ and of the
corresponding sequence, assume we have chosen the one
minimizing t and denote such minimal t by tW . The induction
process will be performed with respect to the lexicographic
order induced by the pair (mW , tW ).
In the case when tW = 0, it means we can find x¯ ∈ X ,
y¯ ∈ Nx¯ such that Wy¯ < βy¯. Therefore, under the allocation
state W , the unit x¯ can allocate a further data atom to y¯.
Considering that the activation of the unit x¯ has positive
probability because of assumptions 1. and 2., this shows that
W is connected to a W ′ such that mW ′ <mW . In case mW = 1,
this means that W ′ ∈W .
Consider now any W ∈ Wp \W such that t = tW >
1. Let x¯ ∈ X , y¯ ∈ Nx¯ and the sequence y¯ =
y0, x0, y1, . . . , yt−1, xt−1, yt satisfying the properties (Sa),
(Sb), and (Sc) above. In the allocation state W , the unit
xt−1, if activated (and this again has positive probability to
happen because of assumptions 1. and 2.), can thus move
an atomic piece of data from yt−1 to yt . The new allocation
state is W ′ =W − ext−1yt−1 + ext−1yt . Since W ′yt−1 < βyt−1 , for
sure tW ′ < tW . The induction argument is thus complete.
We are now left with studying the Markov process W (t)
on W . We start with the following
Proposition 5: W (t), restricted to W , is a time reversible
Markov process. More precisely, it holds(
α
W
)
eγΨ(W)PW,W ′ =
(
α
W ′
)
eγΨ(W
′)PW ′,W ∀W,W ′ ∈W
(11)
where (
α
W
)
:=
∏
x
αx!
∏
x,y
Wxy!
Proof: Notice that the only cases when PW,W ′ and PW ′,W
are not both equal to 0 is for those pairs W,W ′ ∈ W such
that W ′ =W − exy¯ + exy¯′ for some x, y¯, y¯′ ∈X . Assume this
to be the case. Then, it follows from the way the distribution
moves of the algorithm have been defined that
PW,W ′ = νx
Wxy¯
αx
e
γ fxy¯′ (W ′), PW ′,W = νx
W ′
xy¯′
αx
eγ fxy¯(W )
Substituting in (11) and using relation (7), it is immediate to
check that equality holds.
We now show that under a slight stronger assumption than
(1), namely,
∑
x∈A
αx < ∑
y∈N(A)
βy ∀A ⊆X , (12)
the process W (t) restricted to W is ergodic. Denote by L
the graph Lp restricted to the set W . Notice that, as a
consequence of time-reversibility, L is an undirected graph.
Ergodicity is equivalent to proving that L is connected. We
start with a lemma analogous to previous Lemma 3.
Lemma 6: Suppose (G ,α,β ) satisfies (12) and let W ∈
W . Then, for every y¯ ∈ X , there exists a sequence (8)
satisfying the conditions (Sa), (Sb), and (Sc) as in Lemma
3.
Proof: It is sufficient to follow the steps of to the proof
of Lemma 3 noticing that in (10) the first equality is now a
strict inequality, while the last strict inequality becomes an
equality.
If W,W ′ ∈ W are connected through a path in L , we
write that W ∼W ′. Introduce the following distance on W :
if W 1,W 2 ∈W
δ (W 1,W 2) = ∑
x,y
|W 1xy−W2xy|
A pair (W 1,W 2) ∈W is said to be minimal if
δ (W 1,W 2)≤ δ (W 1′ ,W 2′) ∀W 1′ ∼W 1, ∀W 2′ ∼W 2
Notice that L is connected if and only if for any minimal
pair (W 1,W 2), it holds W 1 =W 2.
Lemma 7: Let (W 1,W 2) be a minimal pair. Suppose y ∈
X is such that W 1y < βy. Then, W 1xy =W 2xy for all x ∈X .
Proof: Suppose by contradiction that W 1xy < W 2xy for
some x ∈X . Then, necessarily, there exists y′ 6= y such that
W 1
xy′ > W
2
xy′ . Consider then W
1′ = W 1 − exy′ + exy. Clearly,
δ (W 1′ ,W 2)< δ (W 1,W 2) and this contradicts the minimality
assumption. Thus W 1xy ≥W 2xy for all x∈X . This yields W 2y <
βy. Exchanging the role of W 1 and W 2 we obtain the thesis.
Proposition 8: If condition (12) holds true, the graph L
is connected.
Proof: Let (W 1,W 2) be any minimal pair. We will
prove that W 1 and W 2 are necessarily identical. Consider
any resource y. It follows from Lemma 6 that we can find a
sequence y = y0, x0, y1 · · · , yt−1, xt−1, yt satisfying the same
(Sa), (Sb), and (Sc) with respect to the state allocation W 1.
Among all the possible sequences, choose one with t minimal
for given y. We will prove by induction on t that W 1xy =W 2xy
for all x ∈X .
If t = 0, it means that W 1y < βy. It then follows from
Lemma 7 that W 1xy = W 2xy for all x ∈X . Suppose now that
the claim has been proven for all minimal pairs (W 1,W 2)
and any y ∈ X for which t < ¯t (w.r. to W 1) and assume
that y = y0, x0, y1 · · · , y¯t−1, x¯t−1, y¯t satisfyies the properties
(Sa), (Sb), and (Sc) with respect to W 1. Notice that the
unit x
¯t−1 can move a data atom from resource y¯t−1 into
resource y
¯t under the state allocation W 1 and obtain W 1
′
=
W 1 − ex¯t−1y¯t−1 + ex¯t−1y¯t . Consider now W 2 and notice that
Lemma 7 yields W 2x
¯t−1y¯t =W
1
x
¯t−1y¯t < βy¯t . Define
W 2
′
=
{
W 2 ifW 2x
¯t−1y¯t−1 = 0
W 2− ex¯t−1y¯t−1 + ex¯t−1y¯t ifW 2x
¯t−1y¯t−1 > 0
Clearly, δ (W 1′ ,W 2′)≤ δ (W 1,W 2) and this implies that also
W 1′ ,W 2′ is a minimal pair. Notice that y = y0, x0, y1 · · · , y¯t−1
satisfies (Sa), (Sb), and (Sc) with respect to W 1′ . Therefore,
by the induction hypotheses, it follows that W 1′xy = W 2
′
xy for
all x ∈ X . Since W 1xy = W 1
′
xy and W 2xy = W 2
′
xy , result follows
immediately.
Propositions 5 and 8 immediately yield the following final
result.
Corollary 9: Assume that (12) holds true. Then W (t),
restricted to W , is an ergodic time reversible Markov process
whose unique invariant probability measure is given by
µγ(W ) =
(α
W
)
eγΨ(W)
∑
W ′∈W
( α
W ′
)
eγΨ(W ′)
Remark: Notice that when γ → +∞, the invariant prob-
ability µγ converges to the probability µ∞ concentrated on
the set argmaxW∈W Ψ(W ) of state allocations maximizing
the potential and given by, for W ∈ argmaxW∈W Ψ(W ),
µ∞(W ) =
(α
W
)
∑
W ′∈W
( α
W ′
)
Thus, if γ is small, the distribution of the process W (t) for
t sufficiently large will be close to Nash equilibria.
In this paper we will assume that νx = ναx for some ν >
0, namely that units activation rates is proportional to the
amount of data they need to back up. We will consider two
possibilities for the allocation and distribution probabilities
Pall(W (t),x) and Pdis(W (t),x):
Pall(W (t),x) = αx−W(t)
x
αx
,
Pall(W (t),x) =
{
1 ifW (t)x < αx
0 otherwise
Pdis(W (t),x) = W(t)
x
αx
,
Pdis(W (t),x) =
{
0 ifW (t)x < αx
1 otherwise
In the first case, the probability of an allocation move is
proportional to the amount yet to be allocated while in the
second case, no distribution move takes place before full
allocation is reached.
III. SIMULATION
In this section we present a number of numerical sim-
ulations that validate the theoretical results and show the
performance of the algorithm in terms of various parameters
describing the speed of convergence, resources congestions,
global utility, and complexity of the interconnections.
For the sake of readability we gather below the standing
assumptions and parameters we have used.
• The number of units is denoted by n and assumed to
be even. Most of our simulations are for n = 50 but
we have also studied scalability issues by considering
n = 100 and n = 1000.
• We have considered two possible interconnection
topologies: the complete graph and a random regular
graph of degree 10.
• Time has been assumed to be discrete, assuming that at
every time instant a unit x is chosen with a probability νx
proportional to αx. Moreover, allocation and distribution
moves are chosen acceding to the probabilities:
Pall(W (t),x) =
{
1 if W (t)x < αx
0 otherwise
• Time horizon has been fixed to be T = 2∑αx so that
we have allowed up to two moves per data atom (one
allocation and one possible distribution). It turns out
that in all experiments carried on such time horizon has
been sufficient for completing the allocation of all data
atoms and also getting very close to a Nash equilibrium.
Denote by W ∞ the final allocation state of the system
after time T has elapsed.
• The parameter γ appearing in the Gibbs distribution
have been chosen to be time-varying with
γ(t) = γ(t− 1)+ 1λmax ∗ 100
where λmax is the maximum reliability of the resources.
This is a typical choice done on such best response
dynamics, even if the theoretical result expressed below
can not directly be applied to insure convergence. In real
world applications, where adaptation to a time-varying
scenario (e.g. addition or deletion of units, change in the
topology) is needed, γ must be instead kept bounded.
• We have assumed units to have the same free space to
offer β = 50 and to have possibly different amounts αx
to allocate.
• We have assumed units to split into two subsets of
equal size X1 and X2 characterized by two different
reliability levels, respectively, λ1 = 0.5 and λ2 = 0.8.
• The congestion parameter is chosen to be kc = 1 while
we will consider different values for ka.
Moving data from one resource to another one is an
expensive task which must be carefully monitored in real
applications. To this aim, we have introduced the index νmoves
which computes the number of allocation or distribution
moves per piece of data throughout the dynamics. In formula,
if mi is the total number of moves performed by agent i
during the run of the algorithm, we put
νmoves =
1
n
∑
x∈X
mi
αi
.
The global utility of the system in the allocation state
W is defined as F(W ) = ∑x,y∈X Wxy fxy(W ). Put F∗ =
maxW∈W F(W ).
ρ := F(W
∞)
F∗
measures how the solution found is performing with regards
to the global utility (notice that the potential Ψ does not
coincide with F so that W ∞ is not a-priori a maximum of
F).
Units give preference to the most trusted resource in X2,
however, depending on the amount of data they need to
allocate and on the type of resources in their neighborhood,
they need to use also less trusted resources in X1. We define
the mean and the variance of the satisfaction level as
¯Λ := 1
n
∑
x∈X
∑
y∈Nx
W ∞xy
αx
λy,
Λvar :=
1
n
∑
x∈X
(
∑
y∈X
W ∞xy
αx
λy− ¯Λ
)2
If λ1 and λ2 are taken to be the probability that if contacted
at a random time the resource is available to give access to
the stored data, ¯Λ can be interpreted as the probability that
a piece of data can be recovered when requested at some
random time.
The presence of the congestion term in the utility function
should insure that all resources with the same λ should in
principle be used equally. We measure the mean and variance
of the congestion level of resources in Xi by
¯Ci := 1
nβ ∑y∈Xi W
∞
y ,
Civar :=
1
n
∑
y∈Xi
(β−1W ∞y − ¯C)2
Finally, we consider the in and out mean degrees measur-
ing the topological complexity of the subgraph consisting of
the edges (x,y) for which W ∞xy > 0:
d+ := 1
n
∑
x∈X
∑
y∈X
1{Wxy>0},
d−i :=
2
n
∑
x∈X
∑
y∈Xi
1{Wxy>0}, i = 1,2
Below we present four sets of examples. The first two
are with n = 50 units, αx constant, and different topologies.
The third one deals instead with a situation where units have
different αx. Finally, the fourth example deals with a larger
number of users.
Example 4: Consider a case with n = 50 users and αx =
α = 45 for every unit x. It follows from Proposition 2 that
allocation is possible in any regular graph. Also notice that
Theorem 4 can be applied. We first assume that the graph is
complete and then we analyze the case of a regular graph of
degree 10.
The following table shows the value of the various perfor-
mance parameters varying the aggregation term ka.
TABLE I: Complete Graph
ka = 0 ka = 0.25 ka = 0.45
νmoves 1.6271 1.3068 1.2548
¯Λ 0.6667 0.6592 0.6593
Λvar 6.4818∗10−4 0.0119 0.0122
¯C1 0.8000 0.8450 0.8442
C1var 9.5680∗10−4 0.1149 0.1195
¯C2 1 0.9550 0.9558
C2var 0 0.0280 0.0261
d+ 44.8460 9.5420 9.6720
d−1 43.9280 9.1720 9.1280
d−2 45.7640 9.9120 10.2160
ρ 0.9787 0.6812 0.6796
The fact that, on average, each user makes less than
two moves per each atom, suggests that at the end of the
allocation the system is already near to the equilibrium.
Notice the effect of the aggregation term on this parameter:
when ka = 0, the parameter νmoves is considerably higher as
agents tend to move their data to leverage the congestion
level over all the available resources. When the aggregation
term is present this phenomenon is much reduced as agents
have an incentive to keep data atoms together. The congestion
indices confirm that agents preferably allocate over more
trusted resources and that resources are used sufficiently
equally. We can also see that the aggregation term brings to
a slightly greater usage of worse resources. The parameters
where the influence of the aggregation term is even clearer,
are the degrees: in the first case almost every edge is used
while in the second two cases the number is sensibly lower.
Finally, concerning the utility parameter ratio ρ , notice that
our algorithm performs very well for ka = 0 while we witness
a certain degradation when ka > 0.
Example 5: Consider now the same case with 50 users
where the underlying graph is regular with degree 10. As in
the previous case, the table shows the parameters in the case
with ka = 0, ka = 0.25 and ka = 0.45.
TABLE II: Regular Degree 10
ka = 0 ka = 0.25 ka = 0.45
νmoves 1.4187 1.2185 1.1714
¯Λ 0.6667 0.6596 0.6606
Λvar 0.0019 0.0136 0.0143
¯C1 0.8000 0.8422 0.8364
C1var 0.0011 0.1214 0.1350
¯C2 1 0.9578 0.9636
C2var 0 0.0261 0.0251
d+ 9.9560 6.2580 6.3700
d−1 9.9240 5.9400 6.2520
d−2 9.9880 6.5760 6.4880
ρ 0.9784 0.8872 0.9297
These data confirm the good performance properties of the
algorithm even when the graph of connection is of consider-
ably less complexity. Notice how, when the aggregation term
is present, the number of resources used per agent is some-
thing above 6 to be compared to the previous case where
it was almost 10. In other terms, imposing a constrained
communication pattern, it does not degrade performance and
helps keeping complexity at a lower level.
Figures 1 and 2 show the difference between the graph we
impose and the graph with edges that are used by the users
in the case with ka = 0.25.
Fig. 1: Underlying Network
Next example shows that variability of the amount of the
data to be allocated by the various units does not significantly
change the overall performance of the algorithm.
Example 6: In this example we consider the same number
of n = 50 users split into five equal subfamilies with varying
α = 35,40,45,50,55 (so that the average is still 45). The
underlying graph is assumed to be random regular with
Fig. 2: Used Edges
degree 10 and ka = 0.45. A-priori there is no guarantee
that an allocation exists in this case, however, the algorithm
always finds one. The table below reports the value of the
various performance indices which turn out to be quite close
to the case of constant αx.
TABLE III: Different α
νmoves 1.1552
¯Λ 0.6613
Λvar 0.0138
¯C1 0.8387
C1var 0.1464
¯C2 0.9613
C2var 0.0328
d+ 6.4040
d−1 6.1200
d−2 6.6880
Finally, next example shows that the algorithm has good
scalability properties.
Example 7: In this example we consider and compare
three communities with n = 50,100,1000 always connected
through a random regular graph of degree 10. We assume that
αx = 45 for all units. The aggregation parameter is ka = 0.45.
TABLE IV: Asymptotic Behavior
50 100 1000
νmoves 1.1714 1.1490 1.1304
¯Λ 0.6606 0.6605 0.6566
Λvar 0.0143 0.0146 0.0114
¯C1 0.8364 0.8370 0.8604
C1var 0.1350 0.1262 0.1068
¯C2 0.9636 0.9630 0.9396
C2var 0.0251 0.0183 0.0616
d+ 6.3700 6.2840 6.1902
d−1 6.2520 5.9380 6.0004
d−2 6.4880 6.6300 6.3800
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have proposed, in a game theoretic
framework, a peer-to-peer decentralized storage model where
a network of units are, at the same time, end users needing
to allocate externally a back up of their data, as well
storage resources for other users. We have proposed a novel
fully distributed algorithm where units, connected through a
network, activate autonomously at random time and either
allocate or move pieces of their data among the neighboring
available resources. Actions taken by the units are noisy
best response actions with respect to utility functions which
incorporate the congestion of the resources, their reliability,
as well possibly, the fragmentation of the stored data. The
algorithm has been claimed to converge, with probability 1,
to a Nash equilibrium of the game and several numerical
simulations have here validated this claim. In a forthcoming
paper, we will propose a detailed theoretical analysis of our
algorithm.
We believe that there are several challenges related to
the peer-to-peer storage model which have not yet been
satisfactorily addressed by pure mathematical model. Some
of them are reported below and will be the goals of our future
research.
• In realistic scenarios, for security reasons, units need
to allocate more than one copy of their own data.
This poses new issues and constraints as it becomes
fundamental that copies of the same data are not stored
in the same resource. Most of our theoretical results,
including the matching problem equivalence, will need
to be completely revisited to be applied in this new
scenario.
• Our simulations show that the algorithm has very good
convergence properties. It will be of interest to establish
theoretical bounds on the convergence time.
• In our model, units, thought as resources, are assumed to
be always on and available, if not yet fully congested,
for storage actions. It would be of interest to let the
possibility that resources might be off at certain times
and to connect this behavior to the reliability parameter
present in the utility functions.
• Units, in our model, are completely anonymous and
resources do not make any filter on new allocation
requests. More interesting models should incorporate
trust formation mechanisms where more trusted units
(when thought as resources) should have a vantage in
finding place to store their data.
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